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AMERICAN ROOFING COMPANY AND/OR ] 
EMPLOYER'S MUTUAL LIABILITY, 
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I Category No. 6 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS AMERICAN ROOFING COMPANY 
AND/OR EMPLOYER'S MUTUAL LIABILITY 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the instant case, the Commission1s finding that 
Mr. Green suffered a compensable industrial accident on 
September 6, 198 5, is contrary to current Utah law. Not only 
does his injury on that date fail to come within the definition 
of "accident" as that term is presently defined for purposes of 
Utah Worker's Compensation law, but Mr. Green also failed to 
meet the higher standard of legal causation required of workers 
with preexisting conditions. 
When reviewing the Commission's findings regarding 
general questions of law, the appropriate standard of review to 
be applied is a "correction-of-error" standard and no 
deference is owed to Commission findings. The Commission erred 
in awarding Mr. Green compensation for permanent and total 
disability at a rate greater than 66-2/3% of his average weekly 
wage at the time of his injury. The Commission's award of 
compensation is based upon its interpretation of the interplay 
between Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-75. The Commission's interpretation of the 
above-cited statutory provisions is also contrary to law and 
should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT GEORGE ROY GREEN'S INJURY ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1985, 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A COMPENSABLE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT 
UNDER CURRENT UTAH LAW 
A. Mr. Green's Injury of September 6, 1985, Was 
Not An "Unintended or Unexpected Event" Giving 
Rise To An "Accident." 
Petitioners contend that the circumstances leading to 
Mr. Green's injury on September 6, 1985, do not constitute 
an "accident" as that term is currently defined for purposes of 
Utah Worker's Compensation Law. In Allen v. Industrial 
Comm'n., 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court 
defined the term "accident" as "an unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that may be either the cause or the result of an 
injury." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 22. At the hearing of 
his claim, Mr. Green testified that he had experienced similar 
lightning-bolt like pain in his back on numerous occasions 
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prior to his September 1985 injury. Furthermore, he indicated 
that the occurrence of this back pain was related to the duties 
he was performing. He stated: 
Q# And you explained to Dr. Henry that 
occasionally from time-to-time, you 
had stabbing pain in your back? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you described that to Dr. Henry 
that it was an 'acute stabbing pain 
which is almost bolt-like lightning 
pain1? 
A. Just like. 
Q. And that you'd be sore afterwards? 
A. That's true. 
Q. And that you would treat this kind of 
stabbing pain that you'd get in your 
back by taking a hot bath? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then lying down for a couple of 
hours after that to obtain relief? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so it wasn't unusual from 
time-to-time to have this 
lightning-like pain in your low back; 
is that true? 
A. That's true. 
Q. And you'd treat it by hot tub and 
rest, essentially; is that true? 
A. That's true. 
Q. Can you give me an estimate as to how 
often you'd get this lightning-like 
pain in your back? Was that once a 
week, once a month— 
A. That would depend on the chores I had 
to do. The work I had to do. 
-3-
Q. It's kind of related to the chores 
you did? 
A. Yes. 
(R. at 74-75.) (Emphasis supplied.) And finally, Mr. Green 
also stated that he had been having these lightning-bolt like 
pains in his back ever since suffering an injury while working 
for Paulsen Steel Company in 1983. (R. at 8 6.) 
In spite of his own testimony that it was not unusual 
for him to experience lightning-bolt like pain in his back 
while performing his work activities, Mr. Green still contends 
that the circumstances leading to his injury, on September 6, 
1985, rise to the level of an industrial "accident." As 
support for this position he reasons that, inasmuch as he did 
not anticipate his lifting activities on that date to result in 
further injury to his back, he suffered an "unexpected or 
unintended occurrence." The Utah Supreme Court has defined the 
term "accident" for purposes of the worker's compensation law 
very broadly. However, if the reasoning of Mr. Green is 
accepted, even the limited boundaries now existing will be 
essentially eliminated for one can always argue that further 
injury was not anticipated on any given occasion even though 
further injury may very well have been a foreseeable 
consequence of engaging in particular activities. Because Mr. 
Green's injury on September 6, 1985, was foreseeable in view of 
his prior back history, and because he had in fact experienced 
similar if not identical pain on numerous prior occasions, 
petitioners contend the injury he suffered on September 6, 
1985, was not an "unexpected or unintended occurrence" and it, 
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therefore, does not constitute an "accident" under Utah 
Worker's Compensation law. 
B. Mr. Green Failed to Meet the Higher Standard 
of Legal Causation Required Under Allen For 
Individuals Suffering From a Preexisting 
Condition. 
It is not contested by either the petitioners or the 
respondents that, in order for Mr. Green to meet the higher 
legal causation requirement identified in Allen, he must 
prove that the activities required by his employment 
substantially increased the risk of injury he already faced in 
everyday life due to his condition. Mr. Green was injured when 
he reached over the side of a small Datsun pickup to lift a 
bucket of debris, weighing approximately thirty pounds, from 
the bed of the pickup. Respondents contend that this activity 
required unusual exertion inasmuch as Mr. Green was leaning 
over the side of the pickup at the same time he was lifting the 
bucket and the bucket allegedly snagged on another bucket in 
the truck as he lifted it. In Allen, supra, the Utah 
Supreme Court identified several activities as being typical 
requirements of everyday living. Those activities included 
"taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying 
baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, 
lifting a small child to chest height and climbing the stairs 
in buildings." Allen, at 26. Respondents allege that in 
comparing the above activities to Mr. Green's activities on the 
date of his injury, the petitioners have altered the Court's 
list by adding the elements of leaning over and reaching while 
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lifting to each activity. However, it should be noted that the 
activities identified by the Supreme Court typically, if not 
necessarily, require leaning over and reaching while lifting. 
While it is true one may lift a piece of luggage from the 
ground by bending the knees, holding it close to the chest and 
raising up by straightening the legs and keeping the back 
straight (the type of lifting described by respondent 
Industrial Commission), unloading that same piece of luggage 
from the trunk of an automobile generally requires leaning over 
the vehicle and lifting the luggage at the same time. 
Certainly respondents cannot dispute the fact that the lifting 
and carrying of luggage, identified by the Supreme Court as a 
typical requirement of everyday living, frequently requires 
loading or unloading of that luggage. It is also obvious that 
the changing of a flat tire on an automobile would normally 
require leaning over, reaching and lifting all at the same time 
since most spare tires are located in the trunk of the 
vehicle. Thus, the petitioners1 reference to leaning over and 
lifting in connection with the "typical" activities identified 
by the Court, does not act to alter the Court's list. 
As further support for their position that the 
lifting of thirty pounds by Mr. Green was not unusual exertion, 
petitioners point to the fact that, even following his latest 
surgery, Mr. Green was advised by his doctor to "avoid frequent 
lifting of over 10 pounds and occasional lifting from the waist 
level of over 25 pounds." (Respondent Green's Brief at 3, 
citing R. at 248.) In other words, even in his current medical 
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condition, it appears Mr. Green can occasionally lift 25 
pounds. Nevertheless, respondents continue to claim that the 
lifting of a bucket weighing 30 pounds constitutes "unusual and 
extraordinary" exertion. It is ironical that, now, Mr. Green 
may occasionally lift 25 pounds as a part of his ordinary 
non-employment life, whereas the occasional lifting of a 
30-pound bucket at work prior to his surgery, allegedly 
constituted unusual and extraordinary effort. 
The instant case is one of those rare cases where the 
Court can properly deny the applicant's claim for benefits for 
the injury he suffered on September 6, 1985, and still not 
deprive him of compensation. As stated previously, Mr. Green's 
current claim is a claim for permanent and total disability. 
It has already been determined that Mr. Green is a proper 
candidate for permanent and total disability benefits and 
petitioners do not contest this fact. The finding with which 
petitioners take issue is the finding that the events of 
September 6, 1985, constitute a compensable industrial accident 
rendering Mr. Green permanently and totally disabled. 
It is undisputed that at the time Mr. Green went to 
work for American Roofing Company he was suffering from 
significant preexisting back problems. It is also undisputed 
that, due to the preexisting condition of his back, bending and 
lifting activities frequently resulted in pain in his back. 
(R. at 74-75.) When Mr. Green lifted the bucket of debris on 
September 6, 1985, the pain he experienced was just like that 
he had suffered on numerous previous occasions. Because the 
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events leading to this particular aggravation of his 
preexisting back condition were activities typical of 
nonemployment life and because his resulting injury was not 
unexpected in view of his past history, it cannot be said that 
Mr. Green's employment duties that day resulted in a new 
"accident." Rather, Mr. Green simply experienced an 
aggravation of his preexisting condition and his resulting 
disability is, therefore, properly the responsibility of his 
former employers and the Second Injury Fund. 
As further support for their position in this regard, 
petitioners point to the fact that, prior to his injury of 
September 6, 1985, Mr. Green had voluntarily cut back on the 
number of hours per week he was working for petitioner American 
Roofing due to the occasional lightning-bolt pains he had in 
his back. He testified in this regard as follows: 
Q. He also indicates — Dr. Henry in his 
office notes of May 14, 1985 — that 
the reason you'd cut down on your job 
was that the pain in your back was 
such that you felt like you had to cut 
down. And I'm assuming Dr. Henry got 
that information from you? 
A. That's true. 
Q. Because of these occasional pains in 
your back, this lightning bolt in your 
back, it prevented you from working 
full-time? 
A. It made me lose my desire. 
Q. And for that reason, that was why you 
weren't working 4 0 hours a week; right? 
A. Well, that's true. But we didn't have 
that much work anyway. 
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Q. So a combination of the two, you cut 
back on your — 
A. Right. 
(R. at 76-77.) Furthermore, Mr. Green first began experiencing 
these lightning-bolt like pains in his back following his 
injury with Paulsen Steel Company in 1983: 
Q. And in 1956 you were working, you 
think, in February that year, and you 
fell a couple of feet on some 
insulation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you hurt your low back, the same 
area we have been talking about today? 
A. That's true. 
Q. And it's been ever since 1956 that 
you've had this occasional pain your 
back? 
A. It hasn't really been that bad, not up 
until '83. 
Q. And then after 198 3, it was at that 
point that you had an occasional 
lightning bolt as you've described it, 
in your back? 
A. That's true. 
Q. So would it be fair to say that from 
1956 to 1983 you had occasional pain 
in your back, but then in 1983, 
following your injury with Paulsen 
Steel, that you had the beginning of 
the lightning-bolt sensation in your 
back? 
A. That's true. 
(R. at 85-76.) 
In view of the above-cited testimony of Mr. Green 
regarding the timing of the onset of the lightning-bolt like 
pain in his back and his reason for cutting back on his weekly 
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hours, it is apparent that Mr. Green's back was in such a 
condition that it was just as likely it would give way while 
lifting something at home, as it would while lifting something 
at work. Thus, if this Court finds that Mr. Green's activities 
of September 6, 1985, do not constitute a compensable 
accident, the burden of compensation will fall upon the proper 
parties. 
In view of the above-cited facts, petitioners submit 
that the lifting of thirty pounds, even though done while 
leaning over the side of a small pickup, is not sufficient to 
meet the requirements of legal causation set forth in Allen. 
Therefore, Mr. Green's injury of September 6, 1985, does not 
rise to the level of a compensable industrial accident; rather, 
it amounts to an aggravation of his 198 3 injury. 
POINT II 
"CORRECTION-OF-ERROR" STANDARD IS APPLIED IN 
DETERMINING GENERAL QUESTIONS OF LAW. 
Petitioners do not contest the standard of review, 
cited by Mr. Green, by which this Court is bound when 
reviewing the findings of the Commission on questions of fact. 
However, where the issue presented is a question of law, the 
applicable standard of review is a "correction of error" 
standard. This standard was identified by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d 
779 (Utah 1984). Therein, the court stated: 
In reviewing the Commission's 
interpretations of general questions of 
law, we apply a correction-of-error 
standard, with no deference given to the 
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Commission's interpretations, (Citations 
omitted.) 
Dean Evans at 782. In Board of Education of Alpine School 
Dist. v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984), the Supreme Court 
relied upon the correction-of-error standard to reverse an 
Administrative Law Judge's award of compensation to a public 
school volunteer. The Administrative Law Judge had determined 
that the provisions of U.C.A. § 49-6a-31 (1953 as amended) 
relating to volunteer fireman and U.C.A. § 63-34-11 (1983 
Supp.) relating to volunteers of the State Department of 
Natural Resources implied that the Legislature intended 
worker's compensation benefits to be available to all 
volunteers. The Supreme Court, disagreed, however, and ruled 
that the Administrative Law Judge's interpretation of the 
aforementioned statutory provisions was "patently incorrect," 
once again stressing that where an appropriate court is 
reviewing interpretations of general questions of law, a 
correction-of-error standard is applied and no deference is 
given to the expertise of the Commission. 
In the instant case, the Commission's interpretation 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-67 and 35-1-75 are clearly 
questions of law. Thus, a correction-of-error standard 
should be applied in reviewing the Commission's decision and no 
deference need be given its determination. 
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POINT III 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT MR. GREEN DID SUFFER A 
COMPENSABLE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT, HIS RATE OF 
COMPENSATION IS LIMITED TO 66-2/3% OF HIS 
ACTUAL WORKING WEEKLY WAGE AT THE 
TIME OF HIS INJURY. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 governs benefits for 
claims for permanent and total disability. That section 
provides as follows: 
In cases of permanent total disability, the 
employer shall receive 66-2/3% of his 
average weekly wages at the time of the 
injury, . . . 
In the instant case, the Commission awarded Mr. Green 
compensation at the rate of $201.00 per week. This award 
amounts to approximately 98% of Mr. Green's average working 
wage at the time of his injury of $206.00 per week. As support 
for its award of compensation in excess of that provided for by 
§ 35-1-67, the Commission cites § 35-1-75(1)(e) which states: 
If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the hour, the average weekly wage 
shall be determined by multiplying the 
hourly rate by the number of hours the 
employee would have worked for the week if 
the accident had not intervened. In no 
case shall the hourly wage be multiplied by 
less than 2 0 for the purposes determining 
the weekly wage. 
The Commission's reliance on subsection (e) is misplaced in the 
case at bar because it fails to take into account the fact that 
Mr. Green had voluntarily limited his participation in the 
labor market to only twelve to fourteen hours per week. 
Furthermore, his actual average weekly wage is easily and 
accurately 
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calculated. And finally, the Commission wholly ignored the 
fairness provisions found in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-75(1)(g)(iii) which state: 
If none of the methods in Subsection (1) 
will fairly determine the average weekly 
wage in a particular case, then the 
Commission shall use such other method as 
will, based on the facts presented, fairly 
determine the employee's average weekly 
wage. (Emphasis added.) 
From the above-cited section, it is clear that the methods 
for calculating a worker's wages as identified in subsections 
(a) through (e) of § 35-1-75 are not absolute. This fact is 
especially true where the actual average weekly wage of the 
applicant is easily computed and is not disputed by any of the 
parties. 
Petitioners allege that § 35-1-75(1)(e), was intended 
to apply in those cases where a new employee suffers an injury 
during the first day or two on the job, before ever having had 
an opportunity to establish a work pattern consisting of a set 
number of hours per week. It should definitely not apply to 
situations such as the instant case, however, where an 
individual has voluntarily limited his participation in the 
labor market to less than twenty hours per week. To conclude 
otherwise unfairly rewards workers like Mr. Green since they 
receive compensation at a higher percentage of their actual 
working wage than those who have been working twenty hours or 
more per week. Thus, the fairness provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-75 should not be overlooked in the instant case 
and Mr. Green should be awarded benefits calculated at the rate 
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of 66-2/3% of his actual average weekly wage of $206.00, or 
$134.00 per week. 
CONCLUSION 
The circumstances surrounding Mr. Green's injury of 
September 6, 1985, do not rise to the level of a compensable 
industrial accident under current Utah law. Mr. Green had 
experienced similar episodes of pain in his back on numerous 
occasions prior to this injury. Furthermore, he testified that 
the onset of such pain was associated with the chores he was 
performing. In view of these facts, Mr. Green's injury in 
September 1985 cannot be said to have been an unexpected or 
unintended occurrence. In addition, Mr. Green's injury 
occurred as he attempted to lift a bucket of debris weighing 
only thirty pounds. The lifting of thirty pounds, even while 
leaning over the side of a pickup, does not meet the higher 
standard of legal causation required by Allen of workers 
suffering from preexisting conditions. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Green did suffer a 
compensable industrial accident, however, the Industrial 
Commission erroneously awarded benefits to Mr. Green at a rate 
higher than 66-2/3% of his average weekly wage at the time of 
his injury. Section 35-1-75(1)(e) was not intended to increase 
the benefits otherwise payable to an applicant in situations 
where the applicant has voluntarily limited his piarticipation 
in the labor market and his actual average weekly wages are 
easily and accurately determined. Thus, the findings of the 
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Commission should be reversed and Mr. Green should be awarded 
compensation at the proper rate of $134.00 per week. 
DATED this ///?s day of J~/:'j<,ttf:.<>„ 1988. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
STEPHANIE A. MALLORY 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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